I | The Premise

The proposed U.S.-backed peace arrangement for Gaza—endorsed in principle by Israel’s current administration and, under duress, by Hamas’s political wing—presents itself as a framework for “security, demilitarization, and reconstruction.” Yet in legal and structural terms, it bears the hallmarks of an armistice without sovereignty. Like past attempts from Oslo to Camp David II, it risks institutionalizing control rather than restoring rights.

II | Structural Defects in the Draft Peace Framework

1 | Absence of Legal Accountability

  • The treaty drafts circulated in mid-2025 make no reference to ICJ orders or the Genocide Convention.
  • No mechanism binds Israel to compliance with international humanitarian law or reparation obligations.
  • Without accountability clauses, any “peace” is non-self-executing—it demands faith in a pattern of defiance already documented by the ICJ and UN bodies.

2 | Conditional Sovereignty

  • Proposed arrangements envision an “interim civil authority” for Gaza under Israeli security oversight and U.S. monitoring—mirroring the Area B model of Oslo.
  • Such quasi-autonomy violates Article 1(2) of the UN Charter (self-determination) and risks creating a protectorate, not a state.

3 | Humanitarian Dependency without Structural Change

  • Reconstruction funds are pledged largely through U.S. and Gulf intermediaries, with control of border crossings still Israeli.
  • This maintains the material conditions of siege while shifting responsibility for their mitigation to donors—replicating the post-2008 cycle of destruction and aid dependency.

III | Why It Will Likely Fail

Failure Mechanism Legal/Political Cause Historical Analogue
Deficit of trust No enforcement mechanism for ICJ rulings Oslo 1993–2000
Deficit of equality One party retains total military control Camp David II (2000)
Deficit of justice No acknowledgment or reparations for civilian loss Bosnia Dayton Accords (1995): peace without closure
Deficit of legitimacy Negotiations exclude or coerce key local actors Iraq occupation frameworks (2003–2008)

IV | What a Durable Peace Would Require

  1. Legal Foundations Before Political Compromise
    • Recognition of existing ICJ and UN findings as binding preconditions, not optional narratives.
    • Integration of accountability clauses for genocide, war crimes, and collective punishment into the peace architecture.
  2. Guaranteed Sovereign Functions
    • Control over airspace, maritime access, and borders placed under an international protection regime (e.g., UN-mandated transitional authority) for a fixed period—not Israeli security veto.
  3. Inclusive Negotiation and Representation
    • Genuine participation of Palestinian civil institutions, not solely factional or armed representatives.
    • External guarantors (e.g., Türkiye, Qatar, EU, Arab League) with veto over unilateral violations.
  4. Reconstruction Linked to Rights, Not to Quiet
    • Reconstruction aid conditioned on human-rights milestones and verified humanitarian corridors, preventing “peace for silence” arrangements.
  5. Regional Security Framework
    • A broader Middle East non-aggression compact, binding Israel, Iran, Türkiye, and Gulf states to reciprocal transparency in arms and intelligence cooperation—reducing pretext for “preventive” wars.

V | The Legal Logic of Durable Peace

International law offers a simple rule: peace agreements that extinguish rights do not endure.
The Genocide Convention and the UN Charter place peremptory obligations (jus cogens) above any bilateral accord.
Therefore, a treaty that ignores accountability for mass atrocities is not only illegitimate—it is voidable under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Articles 52–53).
A peace built atop illegality will collapse under its own contradictions.

VI | The Role of the United States and Regional Actors

  • The United States must choose between mediator and participant.
    It cannot supply the weapons that destroyed Gaza and simultaneously certify the peace as legitimate.
    Compliance with ICJ orders should be a precondition for U.S. endorsement.
  • Regional states—Qatar, Egypt, Türkiye—must insist on inviolability of mediation venues and legal parity of parties.
    Their leverage lies in refusing to host or guarantee any process that excludes accountability.

VII | Conclusion — Peace as Legal Rehabilitation

The Gaza peace treaty will “work” only if it functions as a legal rehabilitation process—transforming a zone of impunity into a zone of obligation.
Without that, it becomes merely a cease-fire between unequal powers, destined to collapse into the next cycle of devastation.

True peace, in the language of law, is not the absence of war; it is the restoration of rights.
Until that principle governs the treaty, Gaza will remain less a place of peace than a mirror reflecting the failure of the modern order to live by its own rules.

 

Infographic Panel — Anatomy of a Sustainable Peace Framework

Pillar Required Legal Basis Current Status (2025 Draft) Gap
Accountability ICJ & Genocide Convention incorporation Absent Legal nullity
Sovereignty UN Charter Art 1(2); Vienna Art 52 Conditional autonomy No genuine self-determination
Security Guarantees UN peacekeeping / international protection Israeli oversight Structural imbalance
Reconstruction ICC reparations + verified humanitarian access Donor-driven Dependency
Representation Inclusive Palestinian institutions Faction-limited Illegitimacy risk

Endnotes

  1. Draft “Gaza Peace Framework,” U.S. State Department White Paper (leaked, May 2025).
  2. ICJ, South Africa v. Israel, Orders of Jan 26 & May 24 2024.
  3. UN HRC A/HRC/60/CRP.3 (Sept 2025).
  4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts 52–53.
  5. UNSC Res. 2334 (2016) on settlements; UN Charter Arts 1(2), 2(4).
  6. CRS, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel (2025); OCHA Humanitarian Update (2025).
  7. Amnesty International & HRW, Joint Statement on Post-War Accountability (2025).